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Irish civil society: rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic?
A case study of fighting Irish social security retrenchment
MARY P. MURPHY
Department of Sociology, Maynooth University, Kildare, Ireland
ABSTRACT
Examining the politics of Irish responses to crisis-related social
security cuts gives insight into Irish agency and how crisis has
shaped the contours of Irish civil society. Despite assertions of lack
of protest, Irish retrenchment was resisted and sometimes
partially defeated. Using political sociology frameworks to explore
interactions between institutional, ideological and interest
variables in three case studies of defending cuts enables analysis
of resistance strategies. There are tensions when short-term
defensive resistance strategies undermine or limit offensive
political coalition-building that might offer greater long-term
solidarity and more sustainable resistance to intensification of the
neoliberal Irish welfare state.
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Introduction
There is by now an extensive international scholarship examining global and national civil
society in an age of crisis. Alongside social movement literature (Flesher Fominaya & Cox,
2013) and feminist analysis (Walby, 2011), commentary in a 2011 special issue of the
Journal of Civil Society ‘Civil Society in an Age of Crisis’ raised a number of important
issues (Howell, 2011). Scholte (2011, p. 277), responding to Clark’s (2011) relatively pessi-
mistic assessment of global civil society’s response to crisis, acknowledges that the ‘general
lack of civil society mobilization in the face of the recent global financial and economic
crisis… is indeed striking and worrying’. We focus here on national mobilization of
civil society to crisis, arguing that lessons from examination of the Irish context are
useful for other national contexts.
White and Wood (in press) question the relationship between informal experiences of
activism and more organized forms and ask how organizational forms of activism are
informed by specific social and spatial temporalities, including crisis. They argue for
more informed complex understandings of the organizational natures of activism in
times of crisis so as to achieve better synergies between different types and patterns of acti-
vism and resistance. The aim of this article is to theoretically examine apparently disparate
and isolated responses of different civil society campaigns in Ireland while also contribut-
ing to strengthening capacity to collectively respond to crisis.
Mainstream Irish and global media have welcomed what they perceive as Irish civil
society’s stoicism and maturity in the face crisis (as is the Financial Times, The Economist,
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The Wall Street Journal, Vanity Fair and the International Monetary Fund (Murphy,
2012)). Others described an ‘extraordinarily moderate and passive society’ (O’Brien,
2011, p. 15), or a ‘passive’ and ‘demobilized’ citizenry (Mair, 2010, p. 7). Such perceptions
of passivity in Irish civil society are contested by many (Allen & O’Boyle, 2013; Cannon &
Murphy, 2015; Carney, Scharf, Timonen, & Conlon, 2014; Cox, 2012; Fraser, Murphy, &
Kelly, 2013; Hearne, 2015; Kirby & Murphy, 2011; Murphy, 2012). Hearne’s (2015) analy-
sis of Irish ‘crisis’ protests shows less passivity than often assumed and some successful
‘single issue’ roll back. He argues that protest mobilizations took place intermittently,
often locally and across diverse themes. The most significant protest against austerity
was a national mass turn out against water charges on 11 October 2014. Estimates for
numbers marching varied with the more optimistic suggesting 200,000. This needs to
be understood in the context of the Irish population of 4.6 million: the pro-rata UK
figure would be 2.8 million (pop. 64.1 million). The scale and energy took the organizers,
the media, and politicians by collective surprise; impact was immediate with the extension
of relief for water charges beyond a small number of social welfare recipients to the wider
population (McCarthy, 2014). This mobilization continued as the Right to Water cam-
paign, which subsequently rebranded as Right to Change in an attempt to broaden its
appeal to a wider progressive agenda.
This article explores the tensions within Irish civil society responses to a crisis that
caused the most significant non-wartime collapse of a western economy and that was
all the more spectacular given the degree to which Ireland’s Celtic Tiger model had
been championed as a success story of the neoliberal financial capitalist model. Emerging
literature tends to stress the degree to which, in the notable absence of trade union leader-
ship, progressive campaigns were often led by non-traditional civil society and radical left
organizations (Carney et al., 2014). Hearne (2013b, p. 4) laments the failure of Irish social
partnership and ‘soft’ nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocacy and contends that
the more traditional civil society and trade union leadership relied on more passive forms
of traditional lobbying and advocacy. He argues that mainstream Irish civil society is
immersed in a dependent corporate state–society relationship. With what Hearne
describes as their ‘their traditional ally’, the Labour Party, in government, NGOs were
reluctant to engage in public mobilizations and ‘potentially transformative tactics were
lost by a civil society leadership that did not want to engage or unleash the popular resist-
ance that radical change requires’ (Hearne, 2013b, p. 4).
This ignores the many points of contestation where social policy retrenchment was
resisted by civil society and in some cases successfully defeated. This article focuses not
on the anti-austerity activity of the Irish left but on the responses to austerity of more tra-
ditional Irish civil society, commonly known as the community and voluntary sector
(Daly, 2007). It argues that, with a relatively sophisticated understanding of Irish political
culture, such groups were relatively successful in some instances at rolling back cuts or
ensuring some key supports remained protected. Success here needs qualification: given
the scale of Irish crisis budgets (30 billion euro fiscal consolidation over 6 years), small
short-term victories can be likened to ‘rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic’; they
need to be seen in the context of the overall intensification of neoliberalism. Nonetheless
such victories contest assertions that civil society did not mobilize to any great extent
against austerity politics during the crisis. The general argument, which may have appli-
cation in other national contexts, is that accounts of resistance that focus only on visible
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‘protest’ run the risk of misdiagnosing the nature of protest and prescribing the wrong
medicine for future action or alliance building.
I begin by introducing theoretical frameworks to assist in differentiating the role differ-
ent change actors play in achieving both transformative and incremental change and to
understand the interaction of three different variables, that is, institutions, interests, and
ideas. The article then focuses on successful defensive contestation of three crisis-
related social security cuts: restricting eligibility to one-parent family payments; reductions
in disability allowances; and changes to the universal Child Benefit (CB) income support.
These are not representative, rather they are selected precisely because they contrast with
significantly more retrenchment in Ireland’s nearest neighbour, the UK. This contrast
allows an appreciation of ‘what might have been’ in the absence of protest (albeit there
has been significant UK protest which raises an equally important but unexplored ques-
tion as to why certain retrenchments succeeded in the UK but not in Ireland). In these
three case studies, we isolate key interactions between institutional, ideological, and inter-
est variables that can explain why some forms of retrenchment were at least partially
resisted and what kind of change agent strategies and tactics were pursued. The conclusion
uses the framework offered by Wright (2013) to explore tensions between such successful
resistance strategies and wider proactive engagement and political coalition building. We
conclude that defensive strategies can undermine or limit more strategic narratives that, in
the longer term, might have greater capacity to realize stronger solidarity and more sus-
tainable resistance to the overall neoliberal direction of the Irish welfare state.
Conceptual frameworks
Some frameworks enable informed complex understandings of the organizational nature
of activism in times of crisis, while others enable ways of understanding how to achieve
synergies between different types or traditions of activism and resistance. Ellison (2000,
para 1.2) understands the changing nature of citizenship as characterized by individualism
and fragmentation into what he calls a series of ‘temporary solidarities’ which take the
shape of ‘a social politics characterized by “defensive” or “proactive” forms of engage-
ment’. According to Ellison (2000, para 1.4), proactive engagement shapes new
demands, ideas or practices and new forms of political action to reshape public
agendas, including demands for new kinds of democracy, recognition of ‘differences’, or
special status and new forms of ‘solidarities’. Defensive engagement means citizens
defending themselves against the erosion of their social rights created by the persistent
and occasionally dramatic demands of rapid economic, social, and political change.
This ‘active defence’ happens through interventions in the fragmented social politics of
the public sphere and often in ways that undermine solidarity. Hay (2004) offers a
three-dimensional framework to understand the process of contestation as the interaction
of three variables, i.e. ideas, institutions and interests, and stresses the importance of
avoiding privileging one of these factors over others.
Wright (2013, p. 21) identifies three strategic logics of transformation that characterize
the history of anti-capitalist struggle. Ruptural or revolutionary transformations envision a
sharp break with existing institutions and social structures through direct confrontation.
Interstitial transformations seek to build new forms of social empowerment in capitalist
society’s niches and margins; these serve as both critique and evidence that alternative
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ways of working and living are possible. Symbiotic transformations involve strategies
where the state and civil society simultaneously help to solve practical problems faced
by dominant classes and elites through ‘non-reformist reforms’, that is, reforms that sim-
ultaneously make life better within the existing economic system but also expand the
potential for future advances of democratic power. Wright argues that all three strategic
logics have historically had a place within anti-capitalist politics and that, while it is intel-
lectually easy to raise objections to each or even all of them, it is essential to take up the
challenge of working across the three approaches ‘to do things now that put us in the best
position to do more later’ (Wright, 2013, p. 22). This, for Wright, means a ‘strategic orien-
tation organized around the interplay of interstitial and symbiotic strategies, to create a
trajectory of deepening socialist elements within the hybrid capitalist system, with
perhaps periodic episodes involving elements of ruptural strategy which are a necessary
trajectory of sustainable social empowerment and create space for the interplay of inter-
stitial and symbiotic strategies’ (Wright, 2013, p. 23).
Irish crisis and impacts
A reduction of 12% in GDP and €30 billion in fiscal consolidation are bound to have
impacts. Early Irish crisis Budgets 2009–2010 were difficult for many people but progress-
ive in their overall distributional impact, while later Budgets 2012–2015 were difficult but
regressive. Keane et al. (2015, p. 12) sums up ‘the net effect of Budgets 2009–2015 has been
to squeeze incomes at all income levels, but most of all at the top and the bottom of the
income distribution’.
There were generational patterns. In early budgets the working-age adult social welfare
payments were reduced by 8% (from €204 to €188) while social welfare pensions remained
protected at €230 for assistance-based pensions. During the crisis, social welfare was more
than halved for those under 25 (from €204 to €100) and CB was reduced from €166 per
month in 2010 to €130 per month in 2013 (with additional cuts to the higher payments for
the 3rd + child). The combined impact of cuts and parental unemployment means child
poverty doubled over the crisis. Social-welfare-dependent single families with children
fared worst of all suffering cumulative annual cuts over the crisis.
Market impacts of the Great Recession have also been severe. Between 2007 and 2010
the numbers earning over €100,000 fell by almost 15%, while the average income of those
who were still earning over €100,000 fell by about 8% (Fitzgerald, 2014). Irish labour unit
costs fell by 12.2% during the same period due to the imposition of wage cuts (especially in
the public sector) and an increase in Irish labour productivity (Erne, 2013). Average
annual disposable income fell from €24,380 to €21,440 between 2008 and 2011 (CSO,
2014). Unemployment rose from 6.4% in 2008 to nearly 15% in 2012, but dropped to
9.8% by mid-2015. Long-term unemployment (over one year) rose from half of those
unemployed in 2010 to 60% in 2012 and dropped to 58.4% in 2014; 60,000 are now unem-
ployed for more than 4 years. Underemployment increased, male involuntary part-time
employment doubled and the numbers of households with very low work intensity rose
from 14.2% to 22.9% in the 2007–2011 period (Watson & Maître, 2013). Unemployment
scarring is particularly salient among the working class. Joblessness remains closely corre-
lated with low education qualifications and is a largely working-class experience. Ireland
20 M.P. MURPHY
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scores very high for the number of young people not in employment, education or training
(Gonzalez Pandiella, 2013).
Poverty and inequality rose over the crisis but has not exceeded pre-Celtic Tiger levels
(CSO, 2014). Watson and Maître (2013) find high levels of efficacy in Irish social transfers.
Despite cuts, Irish welfare payments were relatively effective in cushioning people from the
worst effects of rising unemployment and falling incomes. While social transfers reduced
the pre-transfer poverty rate by 53% in 2004, this rose to 71% by 2013. Despite such resi-
lience, deprivation rates still rose from 13.8% to 24.5% between 2008 and 2011 and rose up
to 63% for lone parents (CSO, 2014). NESC (2013) outlines the significant social impact of
the crisis: 10% of the people are estimated to experience food poverty; there is growing use
of soup-kitchen-style food distribution and increased homelessness.
Over six years, the cumulative impact of austerity is deepening and the pressure of new
charges (property tax, water charges, increased utilities, and transport and housing costs)
became more difficult to sustain. Families with children are particularly hard pressed,
especially those in housing mortgage arrears. Barry and Conroy (2013) show that
women are more likely to be employed in the public sector, rely on public sector services
and be in receipt of a social welfare payment; consequently reductions in social expendi-
ture had gendered impacts. Generational consequences of the crisis are particularly acute.
Emigration, unemployment, mortgage arrears and negative equity affect young people and
younger households more than older households. There is every likelihood of significant
scarring for what has become known as ‘a lost generation’.
The overall character of policy and institutions remains consistent, but there has been
an intensification of the neoliberal model. While there have been tax increases, Ireland
remains a low-tax regime with growth in privatization of public services, user charges,
dualization in the labour market, and a sanctions-driven activation regime, and declines
in social protection, investment in health, education, housing, social, care, local, and com-
munity development services. Clearly there is much to protest about.
Social security cuts
Ellison (2000) argues that different groups, regardless of their possession of specific
resources, adopt both offensive and defensive strategies and that one cannot equate proac-
tive forms of engagement with economic strength and defensive forms with economic
weakness. Rather, groups choose to use their power resources in different ways depending
on the issue in question. Defensive engagement means citizens defending themselves
against the erosion of their social rights (Ellison, 2000). Such protest is more likely to
be organized defensively around social divisions already shaped by existing policy dis-
courses, for example, welfare provision. Proactive forms of protest can push beyond
these discursive parameters, for example, framing new debates about ecological sustain-
ability or new forms of democracy. While there are numerous examples of both offensive
and proactive Irish agency, for the purposes of this exploration we focus here only on
examples of defensive campaigns found in Irish social security policy. These three
examples relate to lone parent cuts, CB cuts and disability allowance cuts. These are but
three specific cuts in the context of a 30 billion euro fiscal consolidation, the vast majority
of which was not rolled back in any way.
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One parent family payment campaign
Early in the crisis the Department of Social Protection (DSP, 2010) proposed a single
social-assistance payment for people of working age (SWAP). Budget 2011 introduced
two key structural reforms to an existing One Parent Family Payment (OFP) for which
lone parents are eligible up to age 18 of youngest child and up to age 21 if the youngest
child is in full-time education. Firstly, Budget 2011 declared that eligibility for the
payment was restricted to lone parents with children younger than 14, while a Budget
2012 decision further reduced age eligibility to age 7. Secondly, a higher earnings disregard
for lone parents—originally given in recognition of high childcare costs—was also reduced
with phased reductions reducing earnings disregards by 60% by 2016, levelling it down in
line with Jobseeker’s Allowance. These reforms meant extending jobseeker activation con-
ditions to former OFP recipients, so that they would be required to be capable of, available
for, and genuinely seek full-time employment. Many lone parents of young children
manage work–life balance, and avoid high childcare costs, by working during school
hours. Job search criteria exclude such working patterns. Lone parents could be ineligible
for income support if they wanted to work part-time, and the proposed reforms could
result in lone parents, giving up part-time work, or being denied income support for refus-
ing to take up offers of full-time work.
In response to these changes, the ‘Seven is too Young’ campaign was fronted by OPEN
(One Parent Exchange Network, an existing national, self-organized network of local lone
parent groups), and fought the introduction of withdrawal of the OFP from lone parents
whose youngest child was age seven or over. The campaign material (OPEN, 2012) argued,
‘This unnecessary reform is untimely, ungainly and ill-fitting a government which has
both international and national obligations to reduce poverty, look after children and
protect the most vulnerable.’ OPEN managed to secure crowd-sourced funding for a sig-
nificant bus-stop advertising campaign and worked with other groups, including National
Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) and Children’s Rights Alliance (CRA). They also
collaborated with Single Parents Acting for Our Kids (SPARK), a more militant group
of single parents who organized a parallel 2013 protest, engaged in a Facebook campaign
and mobilized a more politically targeted campaign highlighting the role of the Labour
Party in the proposed cuts.
As the date for reduction of the age threshold approached, a climbdown appeared in the
form of new transitional arrangements announced in May 2013 and applied to lone
parents whose youngest child is over the age of 7 (and therefore no longer eligible for
OFP) but under age 14. DSP announced a mitigating ‘Jobseeker Transitional’ arrangement
for this group (40% of OFP recipients), temporarily exempting them from jobseeker con-
ditionality requirements. They will not be required to seek full-time work, and can con-
tinue a part-time work pattern of more than three days a week (qualifying for a
reduced Jobseeker payment subject to means). When their youngest child reaches age
14, these parents will transfer to full conditionality under the main Jobseeker scheme.
This was an important climbdown and a partial victory for the ‘Seven is too Young’ cam-
paign. It was also a potentially subversive policy outcome, where policy innovation and
policy entrepreneurs created a new layering mechanism, JobSeekers Transition (JST),
which has potential to open up space for other reforms, including individualization of
social security. In November 2014, in a further roll back of cuts, DSP announced they
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would not implement the final €30 of cuts in earned income disregards for OFP, sub-
sequently in October 2015 they announced a restoration of €30 in earned income disre-
gards for JST.
Disability cuts campaign
People with disabilities are organized in a variety of diverse ways and CSO's many of which
had presence in Irish anti-austerity campaigns. Budget 2012 saw controversial cuts in
social-assistance entitlements related to disability and caring. Measures announced in
Budget 2012 provided, from January 2012, the extension of the minimum age of entitle-
ment for Disability Allowance (DA) from 16 years to 18 years for new claimants. Further,
from April 2012, for new claimants aged 18–24, the rates of payment for DA would align
with Jobseeker’s Allowance rates, that is, €100 a week for people aged 18–21 and €144 a
week for people aged 22–24 (reduced from €188 per week). The significant cut of €4576 a
year for people aged 18–21, and €2288 a year for people aged 22–24 would impact on
11,869 persons, almost 12% of all recipients of DA.
Political response was strong and immediate. The National Disability Federation (2012)
and Inclusion Ireland (2011) made strong public protest with the latter arguing that ‘such
thinking shows a total lack of understanding of the support needs of people with a disabil-
ity, disregards the additional costs associated with disability, and appears to roll back on
the principle of recognition of disability under the Equal Status Act’. The Dublin Branch of
Down Syndrome Ireland organized a petition against the change. The public responded to
the campaign of a 16-year-old Cork girl Joanne O’Riordan, who suffers from Tetra-amelia
syndrome, a rare condition characterized by the absence of limbs. Having secured a pre-
vious live TV commitment from the future Taoiseach (Prime Minister) ahead of the 2011
general election that if elected he would not reduce disability funding, she immediately
rebuked him for introducing the Budget 2012 disability cuts. In the context of strong
public support, government changed its mind (Boland, 2012). On 30 December 2011,
under cover of the Christmas break and within three weeks of the budget announcement,
Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Enda Kenny referred the cut to the National Advisory Group
on Tax and Social Welfare, which has been established by the Minister for Social Protec-
tion in June 2011 (Journal, 2011). The Advisory Group first reported in 2013 (DSP, 2013)
and argued that more evidence was needed to support the rationale for age-related
reductions for DA recipients. A subsequent unpublished 2014 report recommended no
such alignment. The cut was never implemented. The political agency of carers was recog-
nized when Budget 2016 fully reversed 2012 cuts to a respite care grant.
Responses to disability cuts appeared largely left to disability activists and NGOs. The
starkest illustration of sectoral responses was the ‘Black Thursday’ national protest by pro-
foundly disabled disability activists reacting to cuts of €10 million or over 430,000 hours of
personal assistance from the Personal Assistance Service budget announced on 30 August
2012. The Center for Independent Living (CIL, a nationwide organization run by people
with disabilities which introduced Personal Assistance Services to Ireland 20 years ago)
argued the cut would make people with disabilities ‘prisoners in our own homes’. The
CIL organized a powerful overnight picket of the Irish parliament by people with disabil-
ities and their personal assistants. This captured public attention and proved a major pol-
itical embarrassment. Government quickly relented but protesters offensively and
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defiantly maintained the vigil and creatively used the opportunity to proactively refocus
the political debate to press for a rights-based response and for the government to immedi-
ately ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (Irish Times,
2012).
The defence of universal CB campaign
Ireland’s austerity regime has also seen severe cuts in child income supports. Budget 2009
announced a phased withdrawal of universal CB income support for children aged 18. A
Universal Early Childcare Supplement for children under age six was halved, then abol-
ished at the end of 2009 and a compensatory universal (school) year of free half-time
pre-school Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) was introduced in 2010. CB
was cut by a further 10% in 2010. Up to this point, social-welfare-dependent families
had been protected from the impact of CB cuts with increases in other child-related enti-
tlements. But from 2011, when CB rates were cut by a further 7%, the poorest families were
not compensated or protected. Budget 2012 announced the phasing out of higher CB rates
for larger families and introduced cuts in mean-tested child income supports. Further CB
cuts were implemented in 2013, so that cumulatively, rates have been cut by 22% for
smaller families, and by a third for larger families. Further cuts in means-tested child
income supports were implemented in 2013. Income support for back-to-school costs
was withdrawn for pre-school children, and the allowance was cut by 18–25%. Income
supports for back-to-school costs were further reduced by 20–33% in subsequent budgets.
Since the beginning of the current economic downturn, new austerity measures across
the EU have meant cutbacks in pensions and health care and a move away from universal
CB to an emphasis on means-tested payments (Heise & Leirse, 2011). While the range of
cuts to Irish CB and other child income supports outlined above was significant, it was also
the case that Ireland survived six austerity budgets without means-testing or taxing the
universal CB payment. This can be contrasted to the British experience where CB is
now income-tested. The universal nature of the payment was maintained in the context
of strong pressure from various quarters, including the formidable Troika (International
Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission) who supervised Ire-
land’s €85 billion bail-out. Universality was successfully defended by a range of groups,
some coordinated and some not.
In the period leading up to and after Budget 2009, there was intense speculation that CB
would be a major plank of austerity packages. Initial media debate was promoted by a 2009
report from the Government-commissioned examination of Public Service Numbers and
Expenditure Programmes, known as the McCarthy Report, (McCarthy, 2009), which rec-
ommended an across-the-board cut in CB rates and a 2009 Report of the Commission on
Taxation (2009), which recommended that CB should be taxed. An alliance of groups
formed to fight for CB to be retained as a universal payment and maintained at present
levels. Both the NWCI and the CRA were in the forefront of opposing any cuts in CB
(NWCI, 2009a). An NWCI (2009a) briefing paper championed CB as a universal
payment that directly supports mothers and is often the only direct payment to
mothers, assists childcare costs for working mothers and acts as a payment for those
who care in the home. An NWCI membership survey showed CB to be a critical part
of family income with 45% attesting cuts in CB would be a ‘financial disaster’ for their
24 M.P. MURPHY
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families (NWCI, 2009b). The CRA (2009) pre-budget submission to government strongly
opposed any cuts, tax or means-testing of CB and framed CB as a valued child-centred
payment which supported universalism and horizontal distribution. It pointed directly
to the potential electoral fall-out: ‘taxing or means-testing CB would be deeply and politi-
cally unpopular’ (CRA, 2009, p. 6). The 2009 Pre-Budget Dail (Irish Parliament) Debates
(1 December 2009) show government referencing the McCarthy (2009) and Commission
on Taxation (2009) alongside NWCI and CRA submissions. Clearly NGOs had some pol-
itical impact.
Post-election 2011 a new Labour Party Minister for Social Protection established the
Advisory Group on Tax and Social Welfare, mentioned above. This first met in June
2011 and by November 2011 its interim report argued that short-term cuts in Budget
2012 would militate against longer term reforms to the child income support arrange-
ments (DSP, 2011). It submitted its first report, Child and Family Income Support, on
27 March 2012 and argued for retention of a universal CB in respect of all children along-
side a better targeting of child income support payments through a two-tier Child Income
Support payment which would result in a reduction in the level of the universal payment
but with compensation delivered through the targeted tier of the payment to those within
the lower to the middle of the income distribution (DSP, 2012). They argued this would
ease the transition from welfare to work and reach more families than the existing in-work
Family Income Supplement (which it would effectively replace).
The report was complex and difficult to decipher. It was launched into an increasingly
hostile political environment, and it was negatively received by civil society, women’s
groups, media, and the public. The ‘Protest against Cuts to CB’ (PACUB) was founded
by a group of mothers working in the home who had been fighting to protect CB since
the April 2008 initial cuts were made to the Early Childcare Supplement. They organized
protests and a 2012 petition with 28,000 signatures and worked successfully with the
NWCI to launch a successful media campaign against taxing or means-testing CB (Irish
Independent, 2011). Media also took up the campaign and the electoral threat was
enough to put paid to any reform agenda that sought to means test or tax CB. In
October 2014 the Tánaiste and Minister for Social Protection confirmed government’s
commitment to maintain a universal CB and increased CB by 5 euros per child in
Budgets 2015 and 2016 even though a Barnardos child poverty campaign argues the
money might be better targeted at child poverty (Finlay, 2015). This can be compared
to the UK, where there has also been very strong opposition to the government’s proposal
to reduce CB for middle- and high-income earners as part of an austerity package. In 2010
the rate of CB in the UK was frozen for 3 years. From January 2013, households where one
parent earns more than 50,000 pounds will have restricted access to CBs.
What can we learn about the politics of reform?
Using Hay’s framework (2004), Table 1 outlines the key institutional, interests and ideo-
logical features of the three defensive social security case studies. Civil society is a con-
tested concept; the approach taken here is to understand that the distinctive form civil
society takes reflects the institutional logic of capitalist arrangements in any one
country (Roginsky & Shortall, 2009). Roseneil and Williams (2004) argue that social
movements are profoundly shaped by the policy direction of the governments they seek
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to influence. Each state actively reframes civil society’s political claims, policy demands
and public values. Irish NGOs operate in the context of Irish political culture, ideology
and institutions and these three cases need to analysed and understood in this context.
Adshead and Tonge (2009) identify Ireland’s peripheral location, conservative and rural
culture, Catholic deference and a weak left as key factors influencing the political
culture of Irish civil society. O’Brien (2011) points to the ‘weak infrastructure of
dissent’ in a historically legitimate Irish state caused by a broader post-colonial tendency
to accept authority. Others point to the nature of education and an absence of citizenship
education, and others to the ‘safety valve’ of emigration as explanations for civil society
passivity. More find explanation in the 1920s civil war and an absence of class cleavage
in Irish society leading to the under-formation of the Irish political left (Murphy, 2012).
The nature of institutions also informs attitudes to protest and may explain the predo-
minance of defensive-style protest and the lack of a more strategic and long-term offensive
orientation. Political culture interfaces with a multi-seat proportional electoral system
which perpetuates clientalism, localism, and personalism. The corporatist nature of the
Irish state has also the capacity to co-opt or silence civil society. Key organizations have
participated in a long social partnership with the state which has left a legacy of interde-
pendence between the state and civil society (Murphy, 2012). Over decades, organizations
have grown comfortable and skilled in a particular style of campaigning and enjoyed a sig-
nificant level of access, even if over time the same level of access sits alongside declining
influence.
In terms of institutions it is clear that the protests are oriented towards the political
system using largely traditional methods: pre-budget submissions, media campaigns, lob-
bying and stunts (small, focused, and picket-like protests); there are few significant
moments of militancy, street marches, or mobilizations. This approach is consistent
Table 1. Summary of institutions, interests and ideologies.
Campaign
One parent family payment
restricted to youngest child
under seven
Disability allowance and personal
services assistant budgets
Universality of Child
Benefit (CB) income
support
Institutions
Where protest occurred
and mechanisms used
. Facebook
. ‘Seven is too Young’
public poster campaign
. Direct lobbying of
constituency offices
. SPARK protest ‘buggy’
march
. Direct interaction with
party politics, lobby days
. Confrontational protest
. Facebook
. Immediate post-budget lobbying
of politicians (personal and
organizational)
. Overnight street protest outside
parliament limited to affected
service users and personal
assistants
. Powerful and emotive use of voice
. Facebook
. 28,000-signature
PACUB petition
. Pre-budget
submissions
. Alliance and
coalition building
. Response to
expert group
report
. Media
Interests and actors
Who worked in specific
alliances
OPEN, CRA,
Barnardos, SPARK
NWCI
DFI, II, CIL, Down Syndrome Ireland NWCI, CRA, PACUB
Ideologies/Values
Major frames
. Mother/child
. Parenting
. Want to work but not until
adequate childcare
. Protect vulnerable
. Right to participate
. Voice and dignity
. Right to work
. International disability rights
. Protect vulnerable
. Mother and child
. Universality
. Parenting values
. Protect vulnerable
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with a number of successful Irish protests, for example, the over-70’s defence of medical
cards in 2008 and demonstrations against cut backs to special needs education assistants in
2010 and cuts to designated disadvantaged schools in 2011. To some degree the small size
of the state, the very local and personalized nature of political culture and the ease of access
to political institutions, including the political elite, means the political system is accessible
to wider groups, thus mitigating the ‘need’ for more visible expressions of anger but also
making protest itself less visible. While there is use of social media, with Twitter and Face-
book dominant alongside new web-based lobbying technologies, there is also a reliance on
traditional methods. With notable exceptions, such as a carnival-like anti-austerity parade
‘Spectacle of Defiance’, there is relatively little innovation, creativity, or use of arts or
culture.
In terms of interests or actors, much of the momentum and orientation is from pre-
existing sectoral and self-organized single-issue NGOs who act as the ‘voice’ of those
experiencing the cuts. There are various levels of mediation of people directly impacted
by cuts, and NGOs often appear flexible enough to incorporate or work alongside other
forms of protest emerging from left political mobilization (in the case of SPARK and
OPEN collaborating in parallel and complementary campaigns, and in the case of
PACUB and NWCI working together). There is a resistance to what is perceived as ‘politi-
cal-hijacking’ or of appearing overly political in analysis. This may be related to tangible
fear that overt political protest would have implications for statutory funding and relation-
ships (Harvey, 2014), with some evidence that a number of groups felt inhibited from or
suppressed protesting as they either feared or experienced a direct loss of funding or
policy access subsequent to protest activity. This may in part explain an absence of signifi-
cant cross solidarity between wider groups protesting retrenchments. It is also difficult to
maintain the profile of single equality issues (gender and disability) in larger more overtly
anti-austerity campaigns, and there is the direct opportunity cost of investing in wider cam-
paigns in the context of diminishing human and financial resources.
Finally in terms of ideology or values, the macro narrative is protecting the vulner-
able. Budget distributional analysis evidences the real vulnerability of the groups being
defended. Images are striking—small protests of women with children in pushchairs or
people with disabilities and wheelchairs outside the high railings which enclose the
national parliament. However, vulnerability exists alongside an offensive rights dis-
course in disability campaigns and offensive demands for investment in childcare in
gendered campaigns. The tendency is for vulnerable people to show their vulnerability,
for women’s groups in particular to frame the protest around children’s vulnerability
and for disability groups to self-organize to protect welfare and advance rights.
There is no macro narrative focusing on capitalism or the vagaries of the neoliberal
regime and specifically there is no dominant ‘anti’ austerity, capitalist or ‘neoliberal’
framing. This does not necessarily imply that such groups support fiscal consolidation;
rather, the core message is framed around ‘vulnerability’ as a compass for managing
fiscal consolidation. Groups appear conscious that appeals to vulnerability are more
likely to work politically but also reinforce such values over alternative values such
as equality. The call is clearly on existing values, and with the exception of ‘rights’
and ‘investment’, there are few attempts to create a narrative around new values.
Defensive strategies tend not to challenge but reinforce popular opinion. This
implies a break with pre-crisis strategies of such groups who were engaged in
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asymmetric partnership arrangements with the state but perhaps more creatively inter-
played with public opinion (Larragy, 2014).
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) use the term ‘symbiotic change agents’ to identify those
who carry out activities that work within status quo arrangements, while also depend-
ing on those arrangements for their own survival. ‘Parasitic symbionts’ survive by prop-
ping up an unsustainable environment and leave themselves exposed. This can happen
in defensive strategies which play into conservative Irish political culture and values
where traditional left-right clusters are less evident (Hardiman, McCashin, & Payne,
2004). Defensive strategies can create discourses that play into dominant values that
the same civil society groups may otherwise and historically have been attempting to
challenge, and this is nearer the experience of parasitic symbionts. For example, pre-
crisis lone parent proposals appear dominated by a social democratic approach to
paid employment (evident in calls for a childcare investment package). Such ideology,
however, co-exists with a conservative ideology that seeks to protect mothers in the
home, to reinforce the role of mother in the home and parenting. The ‘Seven is too
Young’ campaign clearly called for investment in childcare, but the overall frame of
the campaign also reinforced the mothers as ‘vulnerable’ and played into the consider-
able Irish ambiguity surrounding the issue of mothering, welfare and paid work. The
CB campaign may have done likewise. Key informants suggest that they were very
aware of such tensions and attempted to keep more offensive values on the agenda
whilst pragmatically appealing to Irish concerns about the key vulnerabilities of
mothers caring for young children.
To what degree might such lessons bear relevance for understandings of responses to
crisis in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and elsewhere? Clearly, national, historical, ideological,
institutional, and interest formation patterns are important. However, other more
immediate differentiating factors are worth noting. Motivation to protest may not have
been as strong as in other crisis countries where key indicators such as unemployment,
poverty and evictions were significantly higher than in Ireland and, as discussed earlier,
the Irish welfare state, despite cuts, has proved resilient and effective (Cannon &
Murphy, 2015). Government and elites also worked effectively to maintain a narrative
of ‘no alternatives’. While budgets were largely regressive to some degree, cuts did
impact on all income deciles, with the top 10% experiencing the greatest proportional
decline in income. Emigration also proved a type of safety valve.
Conclusion
This article focused on specific points of contestation where social policy retrenchment
was resisted and specific reform proposals at least partially defeated. In part motivated
by the desire to celebrate agency and contest the dominant narrative asserting Irish
responses to austerity as passive and devoid of protest, it also sought to critically interro-
gate such contestation and explore the limitations and consequences (intended and unin-
tended) of such campaigns. By examining the interaction of three variables—institutions,
interests and ideas—the analysis drew out key patterns across three different types of social
security contestation. It pointed to key features of defensive resistance, including defensive
stand-alone campaigns, limited alliance building, sectoral-specific strategies particularly
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fronted by those experiencing cuts, manipulation of underlying ambiguities concerning
liberal, social democratic and conservative value systems, and electoral threats.
While valuable in the short term, there was little evidence that these successful defen-
sive resistance strategies contributed to wider political coalition-building and broader
offensive anti-austerity strategies. There is, as Urry (2000) and Ellison (2000) suggest, a
more fractured and indeterminate quality of citizen participation and more complex pat-
terns of engagement. The examples given show a visible lack of solidarity; public images
are of sectoral defences ‘circling the wagons’ to defend their social provision and are at
times suggestive of even parasitic forms of symbiotic engagement. This can contribute
to an absence of certain forms of social solidarity in Ireland. Allen (2012) concludes
that elites conjure up circumstances which fragment society and limit the possibility of
social solidarity, while Carney et al. (2014) find that family solidarity trumps social or
community-based solidarity. Solidarity is further undermined by a ‘fragmented imagin-
ation’ where we are collectively unable to connect different dimensions of crisis, in part
because differing parts of political economy are reported separately and remain uncon-
nected (Preston & Silke, 2011). The lack of a macro narrative may undermine more stra-
tegic narratives that, in the longer term, might have a greater capacity to realize a more
sustainable resistance to the overall neoliberal direction of the Irish welfare state. Irish
NGOs do reflect on and are aware of these more hidden consequences. However there
is also a danger inherent in rejecting these attempts to defend social provision and to
promote an either/or scenario for protest, as some calls from those in more overt proactive
engagement or revolutionary protest scenarios have tended to do (Hearne, 2013b). The
challenge as framed by Wright (2013) is to recognize the fragmented, complex, and
diverse nature of social politics and the public sphere and to mobilize across this
complexity.
The wide diversity of institutional forms seen in Irish responses to austerity reflects
institutional pluralism and can be seen as a strength rather than as a weakness. Proactive
offensive coalition-building strategies need to work with and alongside defensive engage-
ment strategies to develop strategic narratives that, in the longer term, can maintain soli-
darity and more sustainable resistance to the overall neoliberal direction of the Irish
welfare state. When mounting defensive strategies, the challenge for civil society is to
avoid parasitic symbiont outcomes and to look for reforms that simultaneously make
life better within the existing economic system but also expand the potential for future
advances of democratic power. This includes defending state services as crucial battle-
grounds in combating financialization (McCabe, 2013), ‘building alliances and coalitions
between trade union, community and civil society organizations and taking action which
is essential to broaden and strengthen support’ (Whitfield, 2012, p. 117). McCabe (2013)
argues that there have been some attempts by Irish actors to accommodate institutional
pluralism and heterogeneity in civil society responses to crisis. Other recent evidence of
‘breaking the mould’ can be seen in global development agencies refocusing efforts to cam-
paign about domestic and global inequalities. Likewise the success of the water charge
mobilization discussed in this article’s introduction has prompted many to think again
about the possibilities of wider mobilization and suggests a level of anger behind largely
defensive protests. The origin of the often local water campaigns has been explained as
an outcome of structural strain or ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’. Hearne
relates it to discontent with not only austerity but also democracy. Hourican (2015)
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argues that the eruption of such an offensive style of campaign was not surprising given
the extent of austerity and that its timing might be explained by the particular issue
being particularly sensitive in a post-colonial political culture where ‘local’ and ‘commu-
nity’ holds a dominant place in the value system. The local installation of water pipes in
neighbourhood streets brought austerity ‘home’.
The scale of the water protests has been described as exceptional but such a scale is not
unique in Irish protest. The 750,000 that participated in the tax march of 1979, and more
recent protests of 100,000 (against the Iraq War in 2003, labour market exploitation of
migrants in 2005, and anti-austerity in 2010) all bear witness to significant Irish capacity
for protest.
Against Wright’s (2013) framework, the case studies explored rarely sought wider social
transformation. Their strategies are clearly symbiotic rather than interstitial or ruptural.
However it can be argued that even their limited success can prompt and inspire more
agency and feed into other transformational strategies. As Clark (2011) argued, civil
society must be conscious of the degree to which crisis moulds its own contours and of
how it has to consciously maintain capacity to collaborate across defensive and offensive
strategies and very different mobilizing traditions.
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